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Addressing the Regulator’s Dilemma:
A SELF DRIVE Framework for Balancing
Safety and Innovation
Craig W. Maughan1
The SELF DRIVE Act prioritizes public safety over adherence
to outdated requirements, giving innovators greater freedom
to field-test new autonomous vehicle designs. Its underlying
principles provide a framework for the intelligent regulation
of rapidly growing technologies; regulators and policymakers
hoping to encourage growth and innovation would do well
to apply SELF DRIVE principles to other emerging industries,
including the drone industry.

S

uppose you’ve built a better mousetrap, and you’re very
proud of it. Rather than a simple spring-loaded bar, it has
a net woven of carbon fiber. It detects the little critters
through an intricate infrared sensor system. Your invention works
wonderfully. It’s a technological marvel. You’re sure it will go on to
revolutionize the way people everywhere rid their houses of pests.
However, as you begin to field-test your new
product, you discover that the government has enacted strict
mousetrap-testing regulations. They were created several
decades ago, and they haven’t truly been updated since.
1
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There are still requirements for how powerful the springloaded bar must be and for the maximum size of the weightsensitive trigger—your invention, of course, has neither.
“Those are great regulations,” you say to yourself. “But
they were made for something else entirely! My mousetrap is safer,
more humane, and more modern than those old spring traps, but
these laws are keeping me from bringing my product to market.”
You are not alone in your frustration. In fact, in
technology sectors that are much larger than mousetraps—
such as autonomous vehicles and drones—well-meaning but
poorly created regulations can stifle innovation by trying
to force new industries into old regulatory frameworks.
The autonomous vehicle industry is a prime example
of a field that currently lies stranded in regulatory no man’s
land. The testing of these vehicles touches on highly debated
and important topics ranging from cybersecurity and data
privacy to highway safety. In the absence of a clear national
protocol, many states have addressed these concerns by
adopting their own regulations, which vary drastically. If you’d
like to test an autonomous vehicle in New York, you’ll need to
pay for your own state police escort, something no other state
demands.2 And be sure to have a human operator ready to take
the wheel—unless you’re in Texas, where it’s not required.3
The drone industry currently finds itself in similarly
challenging circumstances. Drones offer a groundbreaking
solution to problems in a wide variety of fields, including
product delivery, mapmaking, and emergency response;
however, regulations have stymied the industry’s growth in the
United States. In Part I, I discuss the challenges that are currently
faced by autonomous vehicle and drone manufacturers, whose
round-peg products are being forced into square-hole laws.
Fortunately, regulators and innovators are working
2
3

Public Protection and General Government (PPGG) Bill, Assemb. 3005,
2017 Assemb., Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
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together toward smarter, more flexible regulations. In Part II,
I address the SELF DRIVE Act,4 a piece of legislation approved
in the House of Representatives in September of 2017, which
would give manufacturers and researchers more latitude in
testing their autonomous vehicles. The bill is currently awaiting
a decision in the Senate. In this section, I claim that Congress
should pass the SELF DRIVE Act, which will give innovators
greater freedom to field-test new technologies by prioritizing
public safety over adherence to outdated requirements.
I then argue, in Part III, that Congress should build
on the successes of the SELF DRIVE Act by creating drone
regulations based on the central principles of the Act. The Act
emphasizes design safety, allows for more extensive testing of
safe innovations, and lays groundwork for adaptive regulations.
I demonstrate why these principles can and should be applied in
drone regulation. Finally, I conclude in Part IV with a discussion
of these same principles in light of other emerging industries.
I. Regulatory Effects on Innovation

To understand the importance of the SELF DRIVE Act and
the necessity of similar legislation, it is instructive to first consider
the effects that government regulation has on the technology
sector, and particularly on emerging industries within that sector.
An emerging industry is one centered around an
innovation, design, or idea that is new and holds transformative
potential. The Internet, the smartphone, and the personal
computer were all, at one point, new technologies that
served as foundations of emerging industries which have
since matured. In our modern society, hardly any aspect of
our lives is untouched by recent advances in the relentless
march of technological progress. The Internet of Things,
autonomous vehicles, machine learning, and blockchain are
4

While I do feel strongly about the Act, the capitalization is not my
own: the full title of the legislation is the Safely Ensuring Lives Future
Deployment and Research In Vehicle Evolution Act.
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all nascent technologies driving emerging industries today.
The reliance by new industries on these emerging
technologies creates a need for intelligent regulation of the
technologies. The initial years of a technology’s adoption
are a critical period, during which regulation that allows
for effective research and development is essential to the
industry’s success. Lawmakers and regulators create the rules
for testing and deployment of new technologies, and these
regulations can have unforeseen or unintended consequences—
consequences that can cripple an industry or delay its growth.
The drone industry has experienced the stifling effects
of early, aggressive regulation. As commercial drones were
becoming more popular and more capable in the early 2000s,
Congress created a policy stipulating that, to operate a commercial
drone, a business needed a public sponsor (such as a public
university) and a Certificate of Authorization; such certificates
were approved only after substantial delays, if at all. With the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress gave the
FAA a mandate to update their commercial drone policies by
2015, a deadline the FAA missed.5 During that time, innovators
turned to overseas markets to develop their products. When the
FAA granted an exemption to Amazon after delaying for nearly
a year, the technology giant’s vice president for global public
policy, Paul Misener, told a Senate committee that the exemption
was too little, too late. “We don’t test [that design] any more,”
he testified. “We’ve moved on to more advanced designs that we
already are testing abroad.”6 His next statement carries a caution
to legislators hoping to maintain innovation and production on
5

6

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(3) (“[The FAA
must] provide for the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system as soon as practicable, but not
later than September 30, 2015.”).

Rupert Neate, Amazon warns Congress: US risks being left behind in
delivery drone business, The Guardian (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.
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American soil: “Nowhere outside of the United States have we been
required to wait more than one or two months to begin testing.”7
The Congress-required policy update was eventually
issued by the FAA, but the rule change left untouched multiple
policies that make widescale commercial adoption of drones
simply infeasible. Unless granted a special exemptions, drones
can’t fly above 400 feet; they can’t be used at night; they
must be kept within sight during operation. Without greater
opportunities for testing and operation, the drone industry
continues to fight against regulatory resistance, at great cost: this
legal battle delays the arrival of a drone-delivered boost to the
US economy, estimated at $82 billion in the first decade alone.8
Despite the regulatory missteps endured by some
industries, others have been given chances to prosper under
less-obtuse regulations. The commercial human spaceflight
industry has had a series of successful breakthroughs during the
current “regulatory learning period”—a limitation on regulation,
imposed by the Commercial Space Launch Amendments
Act of 2004, that has given SpaceX and other companies
enough leeway to test their new technologies with minimal
government interference. As a consequence of that regulatory
decision, the sector has flourished; SpaceX recently executed a
successful launch of the most powerful operational rocket in the
world.9 While such a hands-off approach may not be the most
appropriate course of action for autonomous vehicles or drones,
which more directly affect public safety, those industries should
also have thoughtfully structured and adapted regulations.
7

Id.

8

Id. See also Hans Joachim Heider, Michael Schallehn, Christoph Schlegel & Klaus Stricker, An Autonomous Car Roadmap for Suppliers, Bain
& Co. (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/anautonomous-car-roadmap-for-suppliers.aspx (“[T]he global market
for autonomous driving and assistive safety and comfort features will
be between $22 billion to $26 billion annually by 2025.”).
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Regulatory mistakes of the recent past heighten
expectations for the SELF DRIVE Act, which is currently
being deliberated in Congress. The Act promises to
avoid the misregulation of the autonomous vehicle
industry, a highly competitive and booming sector.
II. Passing the SELF DRIVE Act

The SELF DRIVE Act presents an opportunity for
legislators to take a step forward toward smarter regulations.
By offering less-stringent regulations to manufacturers who
meet certain safety and performance standards, the legislature
can doubly serve the public interest: first, through ensuring
safety, and second, through incentivizing the testing and
development of technologies with profound societal benefit.
The SELF DRIVE Act standardizes regulations of
highly automated vehicles (HAVs)10 across states, replacing
the mess of inconsistent (or nonexistent) state regulations
with a single, uniform, federal standard.11 In addition, the
Act contains important principles that should be followed
as precedent in other technology industries. In this Part, I
present three key ideas embedded in the SELF DRIVE Act that
would contribute to its success; in the next, I will suggest how
these ideas should be implemented in the drone industry.
10

11

“Highly automated vehicles” is the term used in the language of the
SELF DRIVE Act to refer to what may in other contexts be called
autonomous vehicles, self-driving vehicles, or driverless vehicles; for
consistency with the legislation, HAV will be the term used here in the
discussion of the bill.
SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 3(1) (at proposed 49
U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)) (“No State . . . may maintain, enforce, prescribe,
or continue in effect any law or regulation regarding the design,
construction, or performance of highly automated vehicles . . . unless
such law or regulation is identical to a standard prescribed under this
chapter.”).
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A. Safety First
The first key SELF DRIVE principle is the prioritization
of safety. Opponents of the rapid adoption of HAV technology
argue that the technology simply isn’t safe enough yet, and that
HAVs cannot be allowed on public roads until a more certain
guarantee of their safety can be given. Regulators seemingly
face a difficult dilemma, then: allow an unproven technology to
potentially cause public harm through its premature adoption,
or delay indefinitely its emergence through overly prohibitory
regulation? The SELF DRIVE Act creatively solves that problem by
permitting HAV manufacturers to test and validate new vehicles
after they have sufficiently shown that the vehicles are safe.
The SELF DRIVE Act requires that HAV manufacturers
document and submit to federal regulators their efforts at
ensuring safety of HAVs and automated driving systems, as
well as the results of those efforts. Any entity involved in HAV
development must report “test results, data, and other contents
. . . in order to demonstrate that such entity’s vehicles are likely
to maintain safety, and function as intended and contain fail safe
features.”12 That is, in order to qualify their vehicles under updated
federal motor vehicle safety standards, HAV manufacturers must
prove to the Department of Transportation, after performing
their own testing, that their vehicles are reliable and safe.
The creation of a method for that vehicle safety
evaluation is also described in the Act, which provides a mandate
that the Secretary of Transportation create a “rulemaking
and safety priority plan.”13 That plan in part, must “identify
elements [of the HAV] that may require performance standards
12
13

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4(a) (at proposed 49
U.S.C. § 30129(a)(1)(B)).
SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4(a) (at proposed 49
U.S.C. § 30129(b)(1)).
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including human machine interface, sensors, and actuators.”14
Modern vehicle safety extends beyond crashworthiness
and physical protections; as the capacity for computerized
control of vehicles increases, so does the opportunity for
malignant control or hijacking of those vehicles by thirdparty hackers. Accordingly, the SELF DRIVE Act additionally
requires that manufacturers submit a cybersecurity plan
for “identifying, assessing, and mitigating reasonably
foreseeable
vulnerabilities
from
cyber
attacks.”15
The safety regulations included in the SELF DRIVE Act
ensure that HAVs won’t be tested on public roads until their
manufacturers can prove, to the satisfaction of the requirements
created by the DOT, that the automation does not create an
additional hazard to the general public. That safety hurdle goes a
long way toward assuaging the fears of the technology’s opponents
and increasing the general public’s trust of the technology.
B. Leaving Old Rules Behind

The SELF DRIVE Act also prepares automated driving
technology for full adoption by allowing for the testing and
development of HAVs that are unlike the vehicles we see
today in key ways. Future HAVs with no human operator
will have no need for human-operable features such as
steering systems, pedaled acceleration and braking systems,
or mirrors. Legislation that attempts to fit HAVs into the
regulatory frameworks of traditional vehicles will find
itself burdening a promising young industry with vestigial
requirements. The SELF DRIVE Act makes important strides
toward freeing the HAV industry from unnecessary mandates.
To accomplish this aim, the Act expands the existing
safety standard exemption system: under its new rule,
14
15

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4(a) (at proposed 49
U.S.C. § 30129(b)(2)(B)).
SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 5(a) (at proposed 49
U.S.C. § 30130(a)(1)(A)).
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HAV manufacturers can apply to be exempt from particular
safety standards after demonstrating that their replacement
feature (or the vehicle as a whole) is at least as safe as the
standard feature (or a nonexempt vehicle). The Secretary
of Transportation is permitted to issue such exemptions
if “the exemption would make easier the development or
field evaluation of” an HAV or an autonomous feature.16 The
maximum number of yearly safety standard exemptions is
raised to 100,000, a 40x increase over the current restriction.17
To qualify for an exemption, an HAV manufacturer
must—beyond justifying the necessity of such an
exemption for “development or field evaluation”18—
submit an extensive application. A “detailed analysis
that includes supporting test data, including both onroad and validation and testing data”19 must be included.
In other words, the SELF DRIVE Act offers an incentive
and a compromise. An HAV manufacturer that develops an
innovation contrary to current safety standards can test the new
design on its own; once enough data have been gathered to prove
that the updated feature or vehicle is as safe or safer than it would
have been under the safety standard, federal regulators will
allow the HAV to be driven and field-evaluated on public roads.
This new regulatory system, made malleable by a strict
but encompassing exemption program, keeps the roads at least
as safe as they are now; it gives HAV manufacturers reason
to test and prove the safety of their vehicles; and it provides
room for those same manufacturers to push the boundaries
of automated technology in a prudent, protected way.
16
17

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 6 (at proposed 49 U.S.C.
§ 30113(b)(3)(B)(v)).

18

Id.

19

Id. at proposed 49 U.S.C. § 30113(d)(3).

Id. at proposed 49 U.S.C. § 30113(c)(5)(B)).
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C. Room to Grow
The third important principle embodied in the proposed
SELF DRIVE Act is foresight: the Act acknowledges the quickly
evolving nature of the emerging industry and establishes a
structure for regulation to keep up with the anticipated changes.
An HAV Advisory Council is established within the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration to “undertake information
gathering activities, develop technical advice, and present best
practices or recommendations to the Secretary” on a variety
of current issues in autonomous driving, from environmental
impacts to cybersecurity.20 The Council’s recommendations are
also passed to subcommittees of both the House and the Senate.
In addition, multiple segments of the SELF DRIVE Act stipulate
that the rules determined by the Secretary of Transportation
be reviewed and updated, as necessary, at fixed intervals.21
The challenge of predicting the advent or growth of new
industries makes technology regulation difficult. Regulators
need to include room for growth and flexibility in their
legislation so that the implementation of the regulations can
develop alongside the industry. Ideas such as the HAV Advisory
Council provide a method by which the regulation can be
accompanied, evaluated, and changed when made necessary by
unforeseen consequences or adapting industrial circumstances.
D. An Imperfect Solution

The SELF DRIVE Act is not a perfect piece of legislation, and
it does not solve all of the issues currently facing the autonomous
20
21

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 9(e).

See SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4(a) (at proposed
49 U.S.C. § 30129(a)(3)) (“Not later than 5 years after the date on
which the final rule is issued under paragraph (1), and not less frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the Secretary shall—(A) review
such rule; and (B) update such rule if the Secretary considers it necessary.”).
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driving industry. The Act leaves ambiguity in some areas, such as
in determining exactly which HAV features need to be reported
on by manufacturers in their safety assessment certifications. In
addition, regulators in the Department of Transportation are under
high pressure to determine what constitutes a truly safe vehicle.
However, despite its weaknesses, the Act presents an
immediate remedy to critical problems facing an important
industry. By incentivizing safety, allowing exploration, and
anticipating evolution, the SELF DRIVE Act removes roadblocks
in the path of the HAV industry and pushes it forward
into the next phase of growth, development, and impact.
III. Applying SELF DRIVE to the Drone Industry

The underlying principles of the SELF DRIVE Act should
serve as guidelines for regulation of other emerging technology
industries. In this Part, I suggest some methods of implementation
of SELF DRIVE principles in the drone industry. Following the
convention of relevant legislation, I use the term unmanned
aviation system (UAS) to refer to a drone or a plurality of drones.22
A. UAS Safety

As in the HAV industry, and generally in the technology
sector, safety should be of highest concern when considering the
regulation of UAS. How can the principles of SELF DRIVE create
UAS regulations that compel manufacturers to value safety?
To begin, UAS manufacturers must be required to
submit safety plans and reports to the FAA, in the same
way that HAV entities submit similar reports to the DOT.
22

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 331(9) (“The term
‘unmanned aircraft system’ means an unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components
that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for the pilot in
command to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace
system.”).
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Manufacturers must be able to demonstrate to the federal
government that their machines “are likely to maintain safety,
and function as intended and contain fail safe features.”23
The FAA must more specifically define which features
are regulated. It should look to the example of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which in September
2017 released a document entitled “Automated Driving
Systems: A Vision for Safety 2.0.”24 This federal guidance
describes 12 “ADS Safety Elements,” covering the most pressing
technical issues facing automated driving systems.25 For each
of the 12 elements, it provides implementation suggestions
and defines standards. Among the enumerated safety
elements are many with analogous utility in the UAS industry.
UAS legislation must require that, for their UAS designs
to be qualified as safe, manufacturers be able to report on
key questions relevant to those safety elements, including:
-

-

23
24

25

Operational Design Domain: Where, when,
and under what conditions is the UAS able
to operate? For example, can it be flown at
nighttime? In rainy weather? Over urban
landscapes?
Object and Event Detection and Response: How
does the UAS recognize and react to stationary
objects, such as buildings or trees, during
normal flight? How does it behave during
foreseeable collision events, such as a bird or
other UAV entering its path of flight?
Fallback (Minimal Risk Condition): What is

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4(a) (at proposed 49 U.S.C. § 30129(a)(1)(B)).

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Automated Driving Systems: A Vision for
Safety 2.0 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/
documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf.
See id. at 5-15.
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the UAS response to a sudden emergency or
to a situation in which it is unable to operate
safely? How does it respond to sudden loss of
communication with its controller, if applicable?
In an unexpected scenario, will it descend slowly
and safely? Will it hover in place while power
remains?
Cybersecurity: How does the UAS react to
attempted control by an unauthorized third
party? What hardware and software protections
are in place to prevent takeover?

By mandating that UAS manufacturers test and
report on the safety of their UAS, similarly to the SELF DRIVE
Act, new regulation can ensure the protection of the public.
B. Trusting Safe UAS

The exemption system implemented by the SELF
DRIVE Act legislates a measure of trust between regulators
and innovators: in return for proving a certain standard of
safety, manufacturers will be allowed a longer leash to design,
invent, and test. The UAS industry deserves a similar treatment.
Current UAS regulations have constructed a delayprone exemptions process under 14 C.F.R. Part 107 Subpart
D, which authorizes the Administrator of the FAA to “issue
a certificate of waiver authorizing a deviation” from any of a
select set of UAS regulations.26 In order to receive such a waiver
for “a proposed small UAS operation,” a manufacturer must
supply a “complete description of the proposed operation and
justification that establishes that the operation can safely be
conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver.”27 This
stipulation is both overly constraining and dangerously vague.
26
27

14 C.F.R. § 107.200(a) (2017).

14 C.F.R. § 107.200(b) (2017).
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The language of the law calls for a waiver only for a certain
proposed UAS operation, which limits manufacturers: they are
required by law to describe exactly the function of the UAS and the
operation it will perform in order to receive a waiver. There is little
room for adaptation during testing. And calling for a “justification”
that the proposed operation can “safely be conducted” is
broad: what is included in this justification? Should testing and
analysis data be shared? Should prototypes and working UAS
demonstrations be required, or are designs and models enough?
Both of these issues can be settled by a single solution:
before granting an exemption, require that UAS manufacturers
demonstrate, through testing and data, that their machine meets
the safety requirements described above. Once those requirements
are satisfactorily met, along with any additional requirements
determined by the FAA, a waiver should be given—but without
limiting the exemption to a single predetermined operation. Once
a manufacturer has performed exhaustive internal testing and
experimentation on its design, and demonstrated its safety to the
FAA, the FAA should offer exemptions for any reasonable operation.
C. Planning for Expansion

Like HAVs, the UAS industry is poised for rapid growth as
innovators find more uses for the technology in both recreation
and commercial purposes. The evolution of the industry will
warrant consistent review and revision of its regulations.
An October 2017 Presidential Memorandum established
a UAS Integration Pilot Program, in which the FAA is instructed
to “test and evaluate various models of State, local, and
tribal government involvement in the development and
enforcement of Federal regulations for UAS operations.”28 The
Memorandum creates a process by which governments apply
28

Memorandum on Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Pilot
Program, 2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandumsecretary-transportation. See Sec. 2(b)(i).
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to participate in the Pilot Program and allows for exemptions
as prescribed in 14 C.F.R. Part 107 and described above.
The Memorandum is a sign of progress toward
intelligent UAS regulation; one principal purpose of the
document is to “inform the development of future Federal
guidelines and regulatory decisions on UAS operations
nationwide.”29 However, the regulatory experimentation
created by the Memorandum raises serious concerns.
First, the Memorandum’s actions are not broad enough
in their scope. The UAS industry has lost years already waiting
for regulatory action, and piecemeal construction of new
regulations, jurisdiction by jurisdiction—the Pilot Program is
required to enter into agreement with only five jurisdictions in its
first six months—is not enough. A sweeping adoption of definite
regulations, as implemented by the SELF DRIVE Act for HAVs,
is required to kickstart the emerging industry. Additionally, the
regulation runs the risk of creating a tangle of distinct regulations,
such as the mess in which HAV manufacturers currently find
themselves, stumbling to determine state- or city-specific rules. A
strong central policy is essential for continuity in new technology.
To further encourage expansion, new UAS
regulations should establish an advisory council, like
the one created by the SELF DRIVE Act, to allow for UAS
regulators to adjust exemption requirements. The council
will allow for the anticipation of future uses of the technology,
through research done by council members and affiliates.
The SELF DRIVE council comprises a “diverse group”
of researchers, government authorities, safety and consumer
advocates, engineers, labor organizations, environmental experts,
and anyone else the Secretary of Transportation chooses.30
This diversity of experience and background is also essential
on a UAS regulations advisory council in order to anticipate
29
30

Id. at Sec. 2(b)(ii).

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. Res. 3388, 115th Cong. § 9(b).
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and react to the broadest array of industry developments.
IV. Looking Forward, Looking Outward

To stimulate growth in the HAV industry, Congress
should pass the SELF DRIVE Act. The Act is committed
to safety as a first priority; it provides innovative entities
opportunities to research, test, and develop new HAV
designs; and its flexibility and forward-thinking design
will guide industry regulation beyond only the near future.
Perhaps most importantly, the Act serves as a
benchmark for the regulation of other industries. Here, I have
suggested that the UAS industry receive the same regulatory
treatment that the SELF DRIVE Act could give autonomous
vehicles, and I’ve indicated how several of the key principles
of the Act should be applied in considering such regulation.
However, the positive effect of the SELF DRIVE Act will
be maximized as legislators, regulators, and innovators alike
consider that drones are only one of numerous industries
that stand to gain from safe, smart, flexible legislation.
SELF DRIVE principles need to be applied to regulation of
other emerging technologies. Examples of emerging fields
that could benefit from SELF DRIVE-like regulation include
the sharing economy and peer-to-peer exchange; the
Internet of things; smart infrastructure; and 3-D printing.
Predicting which industry will be the next game
changer is not the task of legislators and regulators;
however, theirs is the responsibility to shape our regulatory
framework in such a way that allows for innovators and
actors in the technology space to push society into the
future. The SELF DRIVE Act is a clear step toward that ideal.

